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THE HIDDEN THOUGH FLOURISHING JUSTIFICATION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS: DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, 
NATIONAL VERSUS INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 
by 
Dr. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid* 
Traditionally, there are three main theoretical justifications for intellec-
tual property: law and economics theory, personality theory, and Lockean 
labor theory. This traditional discourse, however, misses almost entirely a 
different theoretical basis—that of distributive justice. Distributive jus-
tice, stemming from John Rawls’s theory of justice, as a stand-alone justi-
fication for intellectual property laws, is presently almost entirely over-
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looked if not actively suppressed. In this Article, I argue that intellectual 
property laws, when initially designed, embodied distributive justice 
principles. Only later, with encouragement from interested parties, it be-
came an economic interpretation adopted as the “only” proper interpreta-
tion. While scholars, such as Professor Amy Kapczynski, have described 
the solid interaction between distributive justice principles and intellec-
tual property regimes as either “externalist” (contradicting values with-
out any overlaps) or “internalist” (built into intellectual property norms, 
such as fair use), this Article suggests a new, third approach. I claim 
that the interoperation given by policy makers modified the intellectual 
property laws within the spectrum between internalist and externalist. 
This Article presents the argument that intellectual property laws, when 
“created,” incorporated distributive principles. Subsequently, when na-
tional courts and policy makers adopted the law and economics ap-
proach, they modified intellectual property laws by employing efficiency 
reasoning in the interpretation of those laws, preferring the law and eco-
nomics justification to a distributive justice approach, resulting in less 
egalitarian outcomes. I further argue that the means to achieve distribu-
tive justice goals embrace not only general laws that were primarily and 
explicitly designed to reduce inequality in society, such as progressive tax 
laws and social welfare programs, but also specific laws, such as intellec-
tual property laws. 
This Article then argues that, in contrast to the national discourse re-
garding intellectual property, contemporary international intellectual 
property tools currently being enacted or negotiated by the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization (WIPO), have explicitly adopted distributive 
justice as their main goal. 
Three important international tools are discussed in this Article. The 
first is the Marrakesh Treaty, WIPO’s International Instrument on Lim-
itations and Exceptions for Visually Impaired Persons. The second is the 
ongoing negotiations concerning an international tool regarding tradi-
tional knowledge. The third is a new WIPO initiative called Search-
Sharing Innovation in the Fight Against Neglected Tropical Diseases, 
which creates a global consortium through which member states and pri-
vate and public entities can share knowledge, promote research, and 
make products available royalty-free to the less developed countries, there-
by giving them access to information and medicines. In the international 
intellectual property context, the distributive justice concept is crucial to 
individuals, groups, and countries, as it allows access to knowledge and 
other humanitarian aid, benefitting millions of people. Unless distribu-
tive justice principles are adopted, those who need this access, mainly in 
developing countries, will be left behind in the wake of the world’s rapidly 
advancing developments. This Article argues that, by shifting from this 
national law and economics perspective to a distributive justice perspec-
tive (as is being implemented in those international tools), U.S. policy 
LCB_21_1_Article_1_Yanisky-Ravid (Do Not Delete) 2/12/2017  12:11 PM 
2017] HIDDEN THOUGH FLOURISHING JUSTIFICATION 3 
makers can attain positive outcomes from the intellectual property regime 
for the entire population by better allocating intellectual property benefits 
and extending access to knowledge to broader groups. I conclude that the 
international point of view could serve as inspiration to U.S. lawmakers 
to rethink U.S. intellectual property laws. This is true especially consider-
ing twenty individuals hold more capital than half of the entire popula-
tion and the inequality of ownership of resources increases progressively. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The discourse concerning the theoretical justifications of intellectual 
property tends to focus on three main substantive theories: the law and 
economics theory, which examines intellectual property rules according 
to their cumulative efficiency and ability to promote total welfare, per-
sonality theory, which focuses on the personality of the creators and in-
ventors, and Lockean labor theory, which justifies the property interest as 
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the fruits of the creator’s labor.
1
 Distributive justice—although discussed 
by some scholars—is considered to be neither a substantial nor a major 
justification of intellectual property; it is rather seen as an exception or 
postscript to the mainstream theoretical justifications.
2 
National legal systems (and other authoritative bodies) justify intel-
lectual property rights under various theories. In the United States, for 
example, intellectual property laws are based mainly on the utilitarian-
economic-efficiency justification of the law and economics approach, as 
they are meant to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”
3
 
French and German intellectual property laws, in contrast, treat cop-
yrighted works, and even inventions, as an extension of the personality of 
the author, according to the personality theory or based on the Lockean 
labor theory of creations as the fruits of the author’s bodily efforts and 
the expression of his soul.
4 
As scholars have observed, international intel-
lectual property laws attempt to reconcile these multiple theories; the 
language of international intellectual property tools reflects the notion 
that international intellectual property laws are motivated at least by both 
natural law and utilitarian considerations.
5 
Intellectual property laws, in 
different jurisdictions, have evolved through different avenues of inter-
pretation, influenced by other theories, such as the personality theory 
and the Lockean labor theory.
6
 In the general discourse on intellectual 
property, no country, however, bases its legal tools solely on the theory of 
distributive justice per se. 
Why should we theorize about intellectual property regimes and ex-
plore the rationales for intellectual property laws worldwide? I argue that 
intellectual property laws were created to achieve certain goals that policy 
 
1
See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in New Essays in the Legal 
and Political Theory of Property 168, 169–75 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) 
(describing various theories underlying intellectual property); Justin Hughes, The 
Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287, 288–89 (1988) (same).  
2 On distributive justice and intellectual property, see Eric Rakowski, Equal 
Justice 86–87 (1991) (discussing rules for distributing benefits); J.W. Harris, Who 
Owns My Body, 16 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 55, 66 (1996); William M. Landes, Copyright 
Protection of Letters, Diaries and Other Unpublished Works: An Economic Approach, 21 J. 
Legal Stud. 79 (1992) (developing a plan to implement Rawls’s theory on the veil of 
ignorance and the entitlement of authors to rights in unpublished works). 
3
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 326 (1989). 
4
Martin Senftleben, Copyright, Limitations, and the Three-Step Test: An 
Analysis of the Three-Step Test in International and EC Copyright Law 8 
(2004); Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual 
Property, 16 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 81, 83 (1998). 
5
Senftleben, supra note 4, at 8–9.  
6 Modern American intellectual property law is based on economic reasoning 
whereas the EU intellectual property law is based on personality and labor theories. 
Hughes, supra note 1, at 288. 
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makers thought were worth achieving.
7
 The underlying justifications of 
the current intellectual property regimes not only created new norms (in 
the form of the current intellectual property laws), but also continuously 
shape them by giving rise to the preferred interpretation of intellectual 
property laws, as well as defining and redefining their boundaries. This 
interpretation today serves as the basis for understanding the intellectual 
property regime. It is therefore important to identify the justifications 
underlying the legal norms. I claim that the three dominant theoretical 
justifications mentioned above, although they are perceived to be an in-
tegral part of the discourse on intellectual property, are not exclusive.
8
 
In accordance with John Rawls’s theory of justice, this Article pre-
sents another theory: distributive justice. Rawls posits that, absent the 
awareness of the advantages of their own status or social position, while 
acting under the veil of ignorance, policy makers should adopt norms 
and rules of fairness, open-access, and equality. These are principles that 
are well embodied in the distributive justice approach. Written from the 
distributive justice perspective, this Article will examine the correlation 
between actual intellectual property norms and the appropriate design of 
the intellectual property regime. 
Scholars who have discussed distributive justice in their writings have 
focused on various specific aspects of the interconnections between intel-
lectual property and distributive justice. Elizabeth Rosenblatt, for exam-
ple, discussed “negative space,” a term she used for areas which she 
claims are not protected by intellectual property law. Such areas include 
cuisine and stand-up comedy. Creation and innovation in these areas 
thrive without any significant formal protection. Rosenblatt argued that, 
for a full understanding of these negative spaces, we must go beyond util-
itarianism incentives and efficiency considerations, and delve into dis-
tributive justice.
9
 Others have found a distributive justice justification of 
copyright to be important for specific fields within intellectual property, 
such as education and archives.
10
 A more common approach discussed by 
scholars explains the exceptions and limitations of intellectual proper-
 
7 Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Intellectual Property’s Negative Space: Beyond the 
Utilitarian, 40 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 441, 446 (2013) (“[B]y pinpointing the theoretical 
justification we can understand to what extent the laws achieve or fail to achieve these 
aims and how the laws should evolve to reflect those goals.”); see also Fisher, supra 
note 1, at 194–99 (discussing the importance of theoretical discussion). 
8
Robert P. Merges, Justifying Intellectual Property 151–53 (2011) 
(stating that efficiency “is not capable of serving as a stand-alone foundation” for 
explaining intellectual property laws). 
9 Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 442, 447–52 (claiming that “some of these 
unprotected areas even seem to benefit from the lack of protection”). 
10 Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property “from Below”: Copyright and Capability for 
Education, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 803, 805–08 (2007). 
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ty—mainly fair use or the limitation of the exclusion period—by the dis-
tributive justice approach.
11
 
In this Article, I propose a different view of distributive justice and 
intellectual property: reviewing legal intellectual property norms in light 
of the distributive justice discourse paints a slightly different picture than 
the one existing today and could adjust the current improper implemen-
tation of intellectual property norms in practice. I argue that intellectual 
property laws were initially designed on the basis of some distributive jus-
tice principles and that only later, with the encouragement of interested 
parties, was a law and economics interpretation adopted as the only 
proper interpretation. 
Unlike other writers, I argue not only that the theory of distributive 
justice is an integral part of the discourse in all areas of intellectual prop-
erty (not just in specific areas, as other scholars claim), but also that the 
original American intellectual property laws were designed in the light of 
distributive justice principles, which still serve as one of the most im-
portant bases for understanding the field. The distributive justice theory 
has been abandoned over the years in favor of other justifications, but it 
should be restored to its prior significance. 
The first Part of this Article describes the three main traditional justi-
fications of intellectual property: law and economics, personality, and la-
bor theories. The discussion continues with an explanation of distributive 
justice principles, providing a general overview, as well as an in-depth dis-
cussion of the theory as it was understood and framed by John Rawls. 
Once this theoretical groundwork is laid out, the third Part of the Article 
investigates theory in practice, examining the suitability of intellectual 
property laws under distributive justice principles, including those on an 
international level. The fourth Part examines how the intellectual prop-
erty regime interacts with distributive justice, reviewing the so-called “ex-
ternalist” and “internalist” perspectives and then proposing a third ap-
proach. The discussion culminates in the fifth Part by reviewing several 
important international tools that have adopted a distributive justice ap-
proach to the regulation of intellectual property, including the Marra-
kesh Treaty facilitating access for visually impaired persons (VIP), and 
tools governing traditional knowledge (TK), including those that broad-
en access to medicines for developing countries. 
 
11 Most notable is Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 129, 160 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De 
Geest eds., 2000) (Distributive justice theory can influence the limitation of rights 
flowing from ownership of intellectual property, such as fair use or the expiration of 
the exclusive period, when property passes into the public domain, as opposed to the 
exclusive period when that part of the population unable to afford to pay for use is 
excluded from enjoying the intellectual property products.); see also Oren Bracha & 
Talha Syed, Beyond Efficiency: Consequence-Sensitive Theories of Copyright, 29 Berkeley 
Tech. L.J. 229 (2014) (explaining the distributive analysis of copyright). 
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II. TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
A. The Law and Economics Approach 
Intellectual property laws in the U.S. today are understood in ac-
cordance with one particular institutional approach—the law and eco-
nomics approach. This approach focuses on promoting the production 
(and distribution) of scientific and cultural goods via utilitarian laws de-
signed to promote economic efficiency. In general, this approach aims to 
maximize the total social welfare of the public from an economic per-
spective.
12 
The economic approach attempts to solve the problem of intellectu-
al property assets as intangible market products, which “free rider users,” 
who enjoy the product without paying or getting permission, can easily 
copy without rewarding the authors and inventors, therefore resulting in 
a lack of incentive for authors and creators to create, invent and share 
the intellectual property products.
13
 Because copying by free riders costs 
less than the investment necessary to create and develop products, the 
absence of protection against free copying threatens to remove the in-
centives for authors and inventors to enrich our world by conceptualizing 
their great ideas into intellectual property products.
14
 Consequently, one 
of the purposes of intellectual property laws is to provide the necessary 
incentive to creators and inventors by granting exclusive rights in intel-
lectual property products to them in order to exclude others from using 
their products without permission and without paying for them.
15 
Accord-
ing to Richard Posner, the public, authors, and inventors have (theoreti-
cally) “signed” a social contract in which the public (society) gives au-
thors and inventors exclusive rights over their works for a limited 
duration—enough to give authors and inventors an incentive to create 
 
12 Margot E. Kaminski & Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, The Marrakesh Treaty for Visually 
Impaired Persons: Why a Treaty Was Preferable to Soft Law, 75 U. Pitt. L. Rev 255, 259, 
265 (2014); see U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Fisher, supra note 1, at 169–70 (discussing 
incentive theory); Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond 
Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 970, 970, 977–79 (2012) (“Giving full 
scope to distributive justice and other values thus requires us to telescope out from 
the internalism that characterizes the field, and to countenance a broader role for 
commons-based production and government procurement.”); Landes & Posner, 
supra note 3, at 326. 
13 Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 
1031, 1057 (2005). On the economic approach to copyrights, see Patrick R. Goold, 
Corrective Justice and Copyright Infringement, 16 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 251, 271 
(2013). 
14 On the impact of commercial piracy, see Gary M. Hoffman et al., Commercial 
Piracy of Intellectual Property, 71 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 556 (1989).  
15
Donald S. Chisum & Michael A. Jacobs, Understanding Intellectual 
Property Law § 1C (1992). 
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and develop.
16
 However, once the exclusivity period expires, the rights 
are transferred to the public and become part of the public domain.
17
 
Following this mechanism, the market price of the product reflects its so-
cial value.
18
 
Although the law and economics approach to intellectual property is 
dominant in the U.S., many scholars have found its prevailing influence 
troublesome.
19
 Professor Amy Kapczynski, for example, not only men-
tions that the intellectual property regime is alleged to be more efficient 
than other approaches, but she also identifies intellectual property thor-
oughly with the utilitarian-efficiency approach. Kapczynski claims that 
the price of intellectual property products gives us a decentralized way to 
link social welfare to the production of information. She further claims 
that, by looking beyond economic justifications of intellectual property, 
we discover different institutional approaches to scientific and cultural 
production that are not less efficient. She argues that the prevailing ap-
proach to intellectual property is in conflict with the values of distributive 
justice because reliance upon price may yield not only unjust distribution 
of existing information resources but also unjust production of future in-
formation resources.
20
 This conclusion might lead us to consider paying 
less attention to the law and economics approach to intellectual property 
and more to alternative theoretical justifications. 
B. The Personality Approach 
According to the personality approach—which is anchored in He-
gel’s philosophy—the justification for allocating private property rights is 
based on the process of imposing one’s stamp on the external world 
through acts upon external property. This process contributes funda-
 
16
Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 40 (6th ed., 2003). 
17 Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on 
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354, 360–62 (1999). 
18
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of 
Intellectual Property Law 39–40 (2003); Fisher, supra note 1, at 169–70 (copyists 
make creators unable to bear their investment); Hughes, supra note 1, at 303 (the 
dominance of the instrumental argument on U.S. intellectual property laws); Aleksei 
Kelli & Heiki Pisuke, Intellectual Property in an Innovation-Based Economy, 33 Rev. Cent. 
& E. Eur. L. 223, 225 (2008); Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Introduction to Intellectual 
Property in the Workplace: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives xviii–
xxi (Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid ed., 2013) (in Hebrew) (on file with author) (proposing a 
new model of allocating rights and benefits of intellectual property products 
developed in workplaces). 
19 Andreas Rahmatian, A Fundamental Critique of the Law-and-Economics Analysis of 
Intellectual Property Rights, 17 Marquette Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 191, 192–97 (2013). 
20 Kapczynski, supra note 12, at 972–80 (2012) (giving full scope to distributive 
justice and other values thus requires us to go beyond the internalism that 
characterizes the field and to countenance a broader role for commons-based 
production and government procurement). 
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mentally to the development and flourishing of individual personhood. 
Personhood and freedom may be expressed through work with assets.
21
 
Recognition of the significance of the right to control property, which 
constitutes a key component in the development of personhood, nour-
ished the concept that creators and inventors have a natural right to con-
trol the use of the intellectual products that are part of their personhood. 
In other words, the process of creating and developing intellectual prop-
erty works significantly fosters both intellectual and emotional compo-
nents of the human personality. From this perspective, it is justified that 
initial ownership of intellectual property products remains with their cre-
ator.
22
 
Professor Margaret Radin adds an additional layer to the develop-
ment of this theory by dividing property into fungible and nonfungible 
assets. Radin develops the personality theory by forming a connection be-
tween property and personhood, stating that personal assets, in which 
one’s personhood is embedded, should be protected more vigorously 
than exchangeable assets to which a person has a weaker connection.
23
 
Moral rights in intellectual property, especially the right of attribution, 
are justified by the personality approach.
24
 
C. The Lockean Labor Approach 
The Lockean labor theory justifies an intellectual property regime 
from a different angle. The author or inventor, as a persona, maintains 
ownership of one’s body and soul, including one’s intellect and person-
hood, from which flows the right to the fruits of one’s labor. Intellectual 
property products are imbued with the effort and personality of their 
creative authors and inventors. Therefore, according to Locke, granting 
rights to the authors and inventors in their inventions, artistic works, or 
other intellectual products is justified. Authors and inventors invest in 
creating and developing their work. Their work represents a resource 
that they own. In other words, the outcomes of people’s efforts must be-
come their own possessions. The assumption is that labor is not only 
physical but also intellectual: a person’s intellect is his or her own as 
much as is his or her body, and thus, rightly, the fruits of the soul be-
 
21
Hegel, Philosophy of Right 40–45 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 
1952) (1821); Fisher, supra note 1, at 171 (summarizing the main points of the 
connection between personality theory and intellectual property); Hughes, supra note 
1, at 331 (discussing the personality approach); Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 18, at II–IV. 
22 Fisher, supra note 1, at 169; Hughes, supra note 1, at 330; Yanisky-Ravid, supra 
note 18. 
23  Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 986 (1982) 
(The more personal property is, the more nonfungible and nontransferable it 
becomes.); see also Fisher, supra note 1, at 169; Hughes, supra note 1, at 336–37; 
Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 18. 
24 Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 18, at II–IV. 
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come that person’s possession. The labor approach is subject to Locke’s 
limitation that the acquisition must leave sufficient materials (“building 
blocks”) to others.
25
 
In summary, the traditional approach to intellectual property de-
fines, interprets, creates and recreates intellectual property laws accord-
ing to these three theoretical rationales: the law and economics theory, 
the personality theory, and the Lockean labor theory. However, this tra-
ditional discourse misses almost entirely a different theoretical basis—
that of distributive justice. The next Subsection will present and explain 
the distributive justice philosophy and its implications for intellectual 
property laws. 
III. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
A. Preface 
The principles of distributive justice are not necessarily consistent 
with either economic-utilitarian considerations, which focus on the effi-
cient solution,
26
 or with personhood considerations and possession of as-
sets (as the fruits of someone’s work).
27
 Rather, distributive justice is con-
cerned with the allocation and re-allocation of social resources, including 
capital and other goods as well as power and rights, in their broadest 
sense, among individuals or groups in society, based on principles of jus-
 
25
John Locke, Two Treaties of Government 287–88 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690); Merges, supra note 8, at 32–33 (discussing the 
Lockean labor approach as the preferred approach to understanding intellectual 
property); see Fisher, supra note 1, at 170 (discussing labor theory); Hughes, supra 
note 1, at 297–98 (same); Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 18, at IV–V. But see Hughes, supra 
note 1, at 298–99 (seeing instrumentalist and normative bases in the Lockean labor 
approach); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1203–04 (1967) 
(arguing that labor theory is an ethical foundation of property ownership). 
26
Posner, supra note 16, at 32–39 (explaining that the law and economics 
approach establishes rules of distribution by type according to the principles of 
justice aimed at maximizing welfare); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist 
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special References to Compulsory Terms and Unequal 
Bargaining Power, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563, 571–73 (1982) (Kennedy discusses reasons for 
preferring the theory of efficiency over distributive justice. The two theories bring 
contradictory results: the efficiency approach aims to improve both groups whereas 
the distributive approach prefers one group (the weak) over another in distributing 
resources.). 
27 Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1197, 
1234–39 (1996) (stating that copyright laws contradict theories about distribution of 
justice). 
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tice.
28
 The theory of distributive justice determines the appropriate prin-
ciples of resource allocation by which distribution will be made. 
The term “distributive justice” is broad, and varies according to the 
different moral perspectives of what is the desired “fairness.” This latter 
term can include various theories, among them, Marxist and other politi-
cal models, as well as John Rawls’s theory of justice.
29
 
William Fisher identifies a series of social policies, most of which 
might fairly be described as having a distributive approach. Examples in-
clude: consumer welfare, the creation of a “cornucopia of ideas includ-
ing . . . access to ideas,” “sociability (community)[,] and respect.”
30 
As ex-
plained by Professor Rosenblatt: “These interests may frequently be at 
odds with each other and, in some cases, among themselves, but to 
achieve an intellectual property system that promotes distributive justice, 
they all must be considered and balanced.”
31
 
The terminology of distributive justice is sufficiently broad that it 
could also include the economic theory as determinative of the allocation 
principles.
32 
Nevertheless, the distributive justice approach differs from 
the law and economics approach in several significant ways. First, the 
economic theory, unlike the distributive justice approach, does not aim 
to achieve social justice, in general, or equality, in particular.
33
 Secondly, 
the distributive justice approach considers the users, and not merely the 
profiting stakeholders, as central and important players whose interests 
should be protected.
34
 
One of the most desirable concepts underlying the establishment of 
the distributive rules is bound to the principle of equality.
35
 Aristotle—
 
28 G. A. Cohen, Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice, 26 Phil. & Pub. 
Aff. 3, 3 (1997) (referring to distributive justice “as just distribution of benefits and 
burden on society”). 
29 Fisher, supra note 1, at 175 (describing a “Social Planning Theory” of 
intellectual property based on political philosophy theorists, including Jefferson, 
Marx, and the legal realists). 
30 Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 458 (citing Fisher, supra note 1, at 192) (discussing 
those values in relation to the incentive to create).  
31
Id. 
32 Michael F. Reber, Distributive Justice and Free Market Economics: A Eudaimonistic 
Perspective, 2 Libertarian Papers 1, 7 (2010). 
33 Mahasweta M. Banerjee, Applying Rawlsian Social Justice to Welfare Reform: An 
Unexpected Finding for Social Work, 32 J. Soc. & Soc. Welfare 35, 42–43 (2005); see also 
infra Section IV.B. For a perspective on how different policies have different 
distributive, and, therefore, social justice implications in laws pertaining to national 
security, see Daphne Barak-Erez, Distributive Justice in National Security Law, 3 Harv. 
Nat’l Security J. 283 (2012). 
34 Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 457–59 (noting the governmental duty to foster 
the ability of people to shape their social environment). 
35
See Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality 12, 68–69 (1991); Joseph Raz, 
The Morality of Freedom 193, 198, 206 (1989); Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. 
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well-known advocate of the principle of equality—argued that “[f]or in 
distribution all men allow that what is just must be according to merit or 
worth of some kind, but they do not all adopt the same standard of 
worth.”
36
 In other words, things should be distributed so that individuals 
get their share based on merit. Over the years, many criteria have been 
proposed for distribution (of rights, power, goods, capital, benefits), in-
cluding need, effort, and achievement. From a legal standpoint, a deci-
sion regarding which of these criteria is (or should be) most important 
has not been made.
37 
The distributive justice approach contradicts the starting point of the 
extreme-radical-libertarian perspective, which rejects the intervention of 
the state in redistribution of goods even when the outcome is problemat-
ic.
38 
The assumption underlying our distributive justice analysis is that, in 
certain cases, the state authorities, including the legislature and the 
courts, should indeed determine the proper distribution. Furthermore, 
whereas the libertarians’ concerns are focused on government misusing 
its power, the distributive justice advocate is more concerned with the 
concentration of resources and power in the hands of a small number of 
groups or individuals.
39 
Professor Robert Merges, in his book Justifying Intellectual Property, de-
scribes distributive justice in the context of intellectual property as built 
mainly on the insights of Locke, Kant, and Rawls.
40
 Merges rejects the ar-
gument that Rawls’s attention to distributive justice cannot be reconciled 
with the property theories of Locke and Kant, arguing that viable intel-
lectual property protection is well embedded within the range of fair in-
stitutional structures that can reasonably be found within the original 
Rawlsian position.
41
 
 
Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 1319, 1319–20, 1329 
(1987). 
36
Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle 145 (F.H. Peters trans., 
Kegan Paul, Trench, Truebner & Co., Ltd. 15th ed. 1893) (350 B.C.E.). 
37  See, e.g., W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 404, 413–15 (1985); 
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495–96 (1974); EEOC v. Mo. State Highway Patrol, 
748 F.2d 447, 455 (8th Cir. 1984); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some 
Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 175, 175 (1982). 
38
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 150–53, 160, 175–82 (1974); 
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution Through Private Law, 91 Minn. L. 
Rev. 326, 335–36 (2006).  
39
Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets 170–88 (1977); C. Edwin 
Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741, 
748–51, 753 (1986); Frank Michelman, Tutelary Jurisprudence and Constitutional 
Property, in Liberty, Property, and the Future of Constitutional Development 
127, 139, 149–57 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1990); Carol M. Rose, 
Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 329, 342–44 (1996). 
40
Merges, supra note 8, at 102. 
41 Robert P. Merges, Foundations and Principles Redux: A Reply to Professor Blankfein-
Tabachnick, 101 Calif. L. Rev. 1361, 1379–81 (2013).  
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B. John Rawls’s Theory of Justice 
Professor John Rawls’s theory of justice addresses the principles of 
just and appropriate distribution rules, which should serve as the basis for 
the allocation of benefits, rights, capital, power or goods, including intel-
lectual property rights, when established by the sovereign (or other poli-
cy makers).
42
 The theory aligns with distributive justice, and its goal is to 
promote social justice.
43
 Rawls’s theory specifically seeks to establish the 
principles of justice to be used as the foundations, or for shaping the in-
frastructure, of the laws of the state, to serve as the basis of all social ar-
rangements among individuals, as well as between governments and indi-
viduals in general.
44
 Rawls questions which fundamental principles 
should guide rule makers and form the basis for the distribution of goods 
on all sides with regard to intellectual property products. To demonstrate 
and articulate the principles of justice—the basis of the rules and norms 
to be determined by the policy makers—Rawls describes the following 
theoretical exercise: envisioning an imaginary gathering of an assembly 
of people.
45
 The role of this visualized assembly is to determine the prin-
ciples of justice underlying the rules established by the sovereign. This 
imaginary group, if conducted in the way Rawls directs, will accurately 
mirror distribution rules.
46
 
The main characteristic that distinguishes this assembly from any 
other is that, in its original form, its members are behind a “veil of igno-
rance.” The defining feature of this “original position” is that all the as-
sembly members are completely unaware of their own social affiliations, 
i.e., whether they are associated with a powerful and influential group or 
with a weak one.
47
 Moreover, the members are unaware of the wealth of 
society as a whole (whether it is rich or poor), the group’s status, any pro-
fessional and economic situations, or its intelligence quotient. Members 
do not know what talents they have, whether they will be employers or 
employees, inventors, creators, or investors. In addition, the members of 
the initial assembly have only general knowledge (limited knowledge) in 
areas such as economics, statistics, and sociology. Knowledge is necessary 
to adjust the concept of justice to the society in which they live. The 
members are aware of available options, but as mentioned, ignorant as to 
which are or are not applicable to them. Thus, this veil of ignorance 
 
42
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 6–7 (rev. ed. 1999). 
43
Merges, supra note 8, at 102–03 (discussing Rawls’s theory as one which 
resembles distributive justice in regard to intellectual property). 
44  John Rawls, Justice as Fairness—A Restatement 7, 25 (Erin Kelly ed., 
2001). 
45
Rawls, supra note 42, at 10. 
46
Id. at 10–12. 
47
Id. at 10. Rawls described the “original position of equality” as 
“correspond[ing] to the state of nature in the traditional theory of the social 
contract.” Id. at 11, 102. 
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makes all members essentially equal, as none are aware of their actual sta-
tus. Their decisions, therefore, are fair and freely made, without pressure 
from coalitions and power groups. 
Rawls claims that the veil of ignorance prevents the establishment of 
principles and rules that suit only a personal cause
48
 or are tailored to the 
characteristics of a single individual.
49
 The principles of justice are a re-
sult of equal and fair negotiations without aggression or coalitions.
50
 
Rawls believed that in the initial situation described above, a decision 
based on two fundamental principles of justice (described below) will be 
unanimous. In his opinion, even though these principles are the product 
of an imaginary exercise, under hypothetical conditions, these are the 
principles we should adopt in our real lives. These principles of justice—
if we could agree to abide by them, behave in accordance with them, and 
accept any limitations on them—would enable truly free, equal, and fair 
negotiation, which in turn would lead to equal outcomes.
51
  
The first principle of justice is: “[E]ach person is to have an equal 
right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible 
with a similar scheme of liberties for others.”
52 
This principle requires 
equal allocation (distribution) of basic rights, and fairness in transferring 
them. When freedoms collide, one party’s freedom should be limited for 
the sake of the others. 
According to Rawls, the restriction of freedom should, as much as 
possible, be mutual and equal.
53 
The members of the imaginary assembly 
who determine the rules are risk averse and afraid of proving to be the 
weaker party, once the veil of ignorance is removed. Hence, this princi-
ple works in favor of the weaker party, which is, in many cases, the limited 
party. 
The second principle of justice determines equal opportunities for 
all: “[S]ocial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they 
are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) 
attached to positions and offices open to all.”
54
 
The strong (dominant) party in society has the benefit of access to 
economic and social advantages even without a rule ensuring equal op-
 
48
Id. at 11. 
49
Id. 
50
See generally Steven J. Brams & Alan D. Taylor, Fair Division: From Cake 
Cutting to Dispute Resolution (1996); Steven J. Brams & Alan D. Taylor, The 
Win-Win Solution: Guaranteeing Fair Shares to Everybody (2000) (describing 
the same principle of choosing a rule without knowing the effect on the one who 
chooses inspired mathematical theories about fair distribution of resources—the 
“mathematics of fairness”). 
51
Rawls, supra note 42, at 17.  
52
Id. at 53. 
53
Id. at 130 (stating that people prefer equality). 
54
Id. at 53. 
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portunities for all. Therefore, in my opinion, this rule supports and pro-
tects the weakest and most deprived group in the society. Equal opportu-
nities ensure a shelter for those who “sleep under the bridge.”
55 
The im-
plementation of this rule would result in regulation of socioeconomic 
inequality in favor of those most deprived. 
Since, in the initial situation, people are unaware of their positions 
in the real world and—according to Rawls—are also risk averse, they are 
braced for the worst. Assuming that each member wants to assure himself 
or herself a dignified life, each will—absent awareness of his or her own 
status—promote the weak parties or make sure that the weak groups will 
have opportunities to advance. Powerful parties are rewarded in any 
event with a substantial amount of goods. Therefore, according to Rawls, 
in the imaginary initial state, members behind the veil of ignorance will 
always seek to ensure the allocation of sufficient basic goods to the entire 
public, in order to protect themselves from suffering disastrous alterna-
tives.
56 
Rawls emphasizes, in this context, the importance of affording rea-
sonable advantages to all parties and making key positions and status lev-
els open to everyone.
57
 
According to Rawls’s theory, the distribution of resources will pro-
mote the weakest segments of society.
58 
The appropriate principles for 
the determination of the rules of distribution (in legislation and judicial 
rulings) are the principles of freedom and equal opportunities. These 
principles emphasize a perspective that supports the weak. 
Though Rawls’s theory has been widely criticized over the years, I ar-
gue that the proper bases for distributive justice can be structured within 
the principles he presented and can be applied in the field of intellectual 
property.
59
 Moreover, Rawls himself noted, on the occasion of the publi-
cation of the 1999 edition of his book: 
Despite many criticisms of the original work, I still accept its main 
outlines and defend its central doctrines. Of course, I wish, as one 
might expect, that I had done certain things differently, and I 
would now make a number of important revisions. But if I were 
 
55 Mark R. Rank, Toward a New Understanding of American Poverty, 20 Wash. U. J.L. 
& Pol’y 17, 30–32 (2006). 
56 For criticism of Rawls, see Nozick, supra note 38, at 183–203, and Amartya 
Sen, The Idea of Justice 52–58 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to Behavioral 
Law and Economics 8 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). 
57
Rawls, supra note 42, at 53–54 (The first principle is more important than the 
second one.). 
58
See id. at 53; Sunstein, supra note 56, at 8. 
59
See e.g., Brian Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice—A Critical 
Examination of the Principal Doctrines in a Theory of Justice by John Rawls 
(1973). 
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writing A Theory of Justice over again, I would not write, as authors 
sometimes say, a completely different book.
60
 
In summary, Rawls imagines a mental exercise that demonstrates 
how equitable rules are determined when the designers of the norms 
(legislators or policy makers) are behind a neutral “veil of ignorance” 
that shields their self-awareness with respect to status or advantages and 
disadvantages.
61
 Behind this veil of ignorance, decisions will be made 
unanimously, adopting two principles of justice: the principle of maxi-
mally equal freedom and the principle of equal opportunities for all, as 
well as encouraging the disadvantaged and the weakest groups in society. 
Accordingly, proper allocation should embody the concept of encourag-
ing and protecting the weak (e.g., in the intellectual property context, 
individual authors). 
It is my premise that Professor Rawls’s theory of justice could easily 
be used as the moral foundation of distributive justice principles applied 
to intellectual property rights.
62
 The theory’s principles should ensure 
equality and fairness among all relevant parties, if the rules chosen reflect 
the values of mutual equality and are not designed only (or primarily) to 
serve the interests of the stronger parties as against the other parties. A 
rule can be considered just and fair if it is chosen by the parties as such, 
at a time when the parties were unaware of their status or the expected 
impact of the rule on them. The theory assumes, as detailed above, that 
legal norms should be set behind the veil of ignorance, where those who 
set the rules do not know their status in the realm within which the rule 
will apply to them. Such virtual negotiations to determine the rules would 
preserve equality, unlike in the real world, where power and influence 
override equality. 
The theory is quite well suited to this discussion as it deals with the 
inherent complexity of labor laws and intellectual property laws, particu-
larly with regard to the inequality between creators or inventors and 
strong enterprises. 
To be truly just, intellectual property rules should be determined in 
relation to the distribution of goods. Goods can be divided among hu-
mans, and are something humans strive to create, but the term “goods” 
in this context is used in a broader sense. It includes, among other 
things, capital, money, property, benefits, governmental power, influ-
ence, rights, and jobs. Moreover, this term also includes fundamental 
 
60
Rawls, supra note 42, at xi. 
61
Id. at 11. 
62
Id. at 6–7; Rawls, supra note 44, at 7. See generally John Rawls, The Law of 
Peoples (1999) (providing more background on Rawls’s “public reasons” theory). 
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freedoms, including freedom of movement, freedom of occupation, 
freedom of trade, opportunities for personal development, etc.
63
 
The Rawlsian principles are consistent, in my opinion, with the as-
sumption that individuals in society are interested in ensuring rules of 
distribution that are based on fair and appropriate criteria that protect 
the public from being adversely affected by powerful parties. To adhere 
to such criteria, however, the distribution principles promulgated by the 
Anglo-American intellectual property legal system must be exchanged for 
principles ensuring that even the most deprived party will benefit more 
than under any other system.
64
 
Rawls’s theory is suitable as a basis for rules governing the distribu-
tion of rights in intellectual property law, since (i) it actually implements 
the principles of equality that are lacking in the Anglo-American intellec-
tual property regime, and (ii) could prevent injustice between groups 
with conflicting interests regarding the distribution of intellectual prop-
erty privileges and compensation. This is very important, since, ordinari-
ly, one party has more power and influence than other parties, as will be 
discussed in the last Part of this Article. 
IV. DOES THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME INTERACT 
WITH DISTRIBUTIVE COMPONENTS?: THE THREE APPROACHES 
A. Three Approaches to Intellectual Property Laws and Distributive Justice 
There are three approaches to distributive justice within the intellec-
tual property regime. While they were initially discussed in the context of 
national law, they are also relevant to international intellectual property 
tools. 
The first approach, the externalist perspective, is described by Profes-
sor Amy Kapczynski, who argues that intellectual property laws are con-
trolled by only one approach, which is law and economics (economic ef-
ficiency). Within this interpretation, the intellectual property legal 
regime is totally detached from any distributive justice approach. Indeed, 
from the externalist perspective, the intellectual property legal system 
and distributive justice are not only separate, but they also contradict 
each other and do not overlap.
65 
Intellectual property laws are perceived, 
 
63 Nik J. de Boer, Fundamental Rights and the EU Internal Market: Just How 
Fundamental Are the EU Treaty Freedoms? A Normative Enquiry Based John Rawls’ Political 
Philosophy, 9 Utrecht L. Rev. 148, 166–67 (2013).  
64
Rawls, supra note 42, at 13. 
65 Kapczynski, supra note 12, at 973–74, 978–79. Areas such as science, internet 
entertainment, Wikipedia, and free software are generated by a “common based 
approach” or with governmental funding to develop public domain products, both of 
which are totally different from the exclusive approach of intellectual property. 
Intellectual property is not just a problematic way to distribute scientific and cultural 
goods but is also a problematic way to produce them. A system based on price will 
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under this approach, as promoting inequality, whereas the main goal of 
distributive justice is to achieve equality. 
The second approach, the internalist perspective, sees distributive jus-
tice as a new tool to interpret certain specific parts of intellectual proper-
ty law, in particular, “fair use.”
66 
This internalist approach focuses on how 
broad the scope of exclusive intellectual property rights should be, and, 
mirroring that question, how narrow the exceptions and limitations of 
intellectual property laws should be.
67
 This approach finds a means of dis-
tributive justice in intellectual property laws, but only in a limited man-
ner, specifically aimed at a few anecdotal situations. Intellectual property 
laws in general are still perceived from the internalist perspective as 
stemming from traditional reasoning, such as the economic, labor, or 
personality approaches. 
In contrast to either of the above approaches, this Article proposes a 
different concept for the interconnection between intellectual property 
laws and distributive justice. I disagree with the externalist perspective 
that intellectual property laws are created separately from distributive jus-
tice principles. I also disagree with the internalist approach that intellec-
tual property policy is a retrospective tool for distributive justice, limited 
to only a few specific fields within the realm of intellectual property. I 
suggest a third approach: that intellectual property laws have reflected 
distributive justice principles from the very beginning. I argue that intel-
lectual property and distributive justice not only do not contradict each 
other, but they also were “born” together and can “get along” in harmony 
and synergy. The now-prevalent understanding of intellectual property, 
which essentially adopts the law and economics interpretation of intellec-
tual property laws, emerged only later on, influenced by certain groups 
with specific interests. 
Unlike the small group of scholars who write about distributive jus-
tice and intellectual property, mainly from the second, internal, perspec-
tive, I claim that intellectual property laws embody distributive justice 
principles. Intellectual property laws, however, have been subsequently 
changed by external policy makers, in accordance with other perspectives 
and goals that they promoted.
68
  
 
probably prioritize the wealthy and leave out the poor. Id. See also Rosenblatt, supra 
note 7, at 447–52 (discussing “negative spaces” which are areas that are not controlled 
by intellectual property rules). Both Kapczynski and Rosenblatt challenge the 
conclusion usually taken for granted that intellectual property protection is necessary 
to encourage authors and inventors to invest in the creation process. 
66 Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 
1535, 1537–39, 1567 (2005) (stating that poor artists who do not profit from their 
works should more easily benefit from the fair use doctrine); Menell, supra note 11, at 
1600. 
67 Kapczynski, supra note 12, at 975.  
68
Id. at 995.  
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B. Intellectual Property Laws Were Created (Equal) in Light of Distributive 
Justice Principles 
Copyright law and patent law cannot be indifferent to allocation 
rules. In my opinion, intellectual property laws were initially designed in 
the light of the more egalitarian allocation concepts that characterize dis-
tributive justice.
69
 Unlike general distributive tools, however, intellectual 
property laws promote equality only within the intellectual property con-
text and not among the entire population. 
Intellectual property laws create a legal regime that deals with dis-
tributive dilemmas concerning intellectual property rights. Ownership of 
property (including intellectual property) is a source of economic power, 
as well as cultural, political, and social influence.
70
 This power endangers 
the freedom of subordinates. Thus, providing compelling forces on cer-
tain owners of intellectual property clearly has a distributive dimension.
71
 
If property rights represent freedom, security, independence, and priva-
cy, then the allocation of property rights literally means allocation among 
members of society in accordance with these values.
72
 
I further argue that the more powerful the existing forces in the 
market, the greater the probability that the market will change the per-
ception of what should be the right justification and, hence, the pre-
ferred method of allocating intellectual property. Therefore, the domi-
nance of the economic approach did not precede the establishment of 
intellectual property laws, but, rather, came later, serving the interests of 
specific groups. 
The allocation of ownership rights by intellectual property laws is 
one of the clearest examples of a distributive justice mechanism. Pursu-
ant to the United States Constitution, U.S. intellectual property laws orig-
inally allocated ownership rights in intellectual property products to in-
ventors and authors.
73 
Accordingly, the creators and inventors were 
initially entitled to intellectual property rights in their works. Consider-
ing the fact that, today, approximately 80 to 90 percent of all inventions 
 
69
Merges, supra note 8, at 103.  
70 Geoffrey D. Korff, Reviving the Forgotten American Dream, 113 Pa. St. L. Rev. 
417, 422–27 (2008).  
71 Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8, 12 (1927); 
Michael Robertson, Property and Ideology, 8 Can. J.L. & Jurisp. 275, 283–84 (1995); 
Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Property: A Special Right, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1033, 
1046 (1996).  
72 C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 741, 748–51 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 Colum. L. 
Rev. 873, 903–04 (1987) (adoption of the libertarian view of intellectual sovereignty 
blocks any proposals to change the distribution of resources in society on behalf of 
the value of freedom). 
73
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . . To promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”). 
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in the United States are the work of employee-inventors,
 
it is rather sur-
prising that these inventors, the dominant portion of inventors in the 
United States, have found themselves excluded by the current dominant 
understanding of intellectual property rights (i.e., according to the dom-
inant economic discourse) and denied rights and other benefits, even 
though it is they who were originally entitled to the intellectual property 
rights by the United States Constitution and by intellectual property 
laws.
74
 Today, however, the typical employee-inventors have transferred 
all these intellectual property rights to their employers—before even hav-
ing the chance to invent—by a contractual tool which courts fully recog-
nize.
75
 
In the context of employee-inventors, international tools leave the al-
location of intellectual property rights between employee inventors and 
their employers to national laws.
76 
The beneficiaries of this intellectual 
property rights allocation have been supported by United States courts, 
which validate contracts transferring intellectual property rights to firms, 
employers, or other economically oriented entities, thereby diluting—to 
the point of destruction—the rights of authors and inventors, especially 
in the case of employee-inventors and creators.
77
 This is contrary to the 
original intellectual property norms and the distributive principles that 
were embodied within them. 
The reason for this reallocation is deeply rooted in the law and eco-
nomics discourse.
78 
One of the most important foundations of intellectual 
 
74 William P. Hovell, Patent Ownership: An Employer’s Rights to His Employee’s 
Invention, 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 863, 863 (1983) (“Eighty-four percent of American 
patents are awarded to employed inventors . . . .”); Henrik D. Parker, Note, Reform for 
Rights of Employed Inventors, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 603, 603 (1984) (“[T]echnological 
innovation is one of the United States’ most important economic resources, this 
country cannot afford to allow other countries to continue carving out increasingly 
larger shares of the market for technology.”).  
75 Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Rethinking Innovation and Productivity Within the 
Workplace Amidst Economic Uncertainty, 24 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 
143, 145 (2013) (arguing that “[i]mproving the productivity of these employed 
inventors, in order to generate more innovative ideas and pursue worthy ones to the 
point of economic viability, has to become a critical factor in the modern commercial 
era, and even more so now in a time of recession”). 
76
See generally Sanna Wolk, Remuneration of Employee Inventors—Is There a Common 
European Ground? A Comparison of National Laws on Compensation of Inventors in 
Germany, France, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, 42 Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. & 
Competition L. 272 (2011) (comparing national laws regarding employees’ 
inventions and inventors’ compensation in Germany, France, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom). 
77  Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 18; Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, “For a Mess of Pottage”: 
Incentivizing Creative Employees Toward Improved Competitiveness, Cornell HR Rev. 1, 1, 
4 (May 19, 2013), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1042&context=chrr; Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 75, at 149–50. 
78 Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 18, at v–x.  
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property laws is the incentive for creation and development. The law and 
economics approach to intellectual property offers these incentives to 
firms and employers.
79 
As a result, there is no longer an incentive for in-
ventors and creators when, instead of receiving rights in the product they 
have developed, they are totally deprived of the benefits from the prod-
uct. 
In summary, the allocation rules under intellectual property laws 
should be based upon the principles of equality, as originally envisioned, 
and, if they were, would be more efficient in distributing welfare justly. 
C. Exceptions and Limitations 
Intellectual property laws established side by side, intellectual prop-
erty rights (e.g., copyrights, patents) and, on the other hand, exceptions 
and limitations to these rights (e.g., fair use, limitation on period of ex-
clusivity), mainly distributing the ownership rights in intellectual proper-
ty products to a broader group of users. The exceptions and limitations 
afford users in some cases (such as for fair use) a free license to use the 
product, without asking permission or paying for such use. These integral 
provisions, based on distributive justice reasoning, are a part of intellec-
tual property laws that expand the number of users who can enjoy the 
products of creativity.
80
 Intellectual property laws were developed and are 
still evolving under the strong influence of international conventions, 
mainly controlled at present by the World Intellectual Property Organi-
zation (WIPO).
81 
As Professor Kaminski and I stated previously: “Interna-
tional instruments addressing copyright were designed to promote har-
monization among countries by establishing uniform ways of protecting 
the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works.”
82 
Important in-
ternational tools include the Berne Convention for The Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention), the WIPO Copyright 
 
79 Yuval Feldman, An Experimental Approach to the Study of Social Norms: The 
Allocation of Intellectual Property Rights in the Workplace, 10 J. Intell. Prop. L. 59, 66–67 
(2002).  
80
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see also Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use 
Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 41, 43 (2001); Pierre 
N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1109–10 (1990); William 
F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11 
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 667, 668 (1993). 
81
WIPO-Administered Treaties, World Intell. Prop. Org., http://www.wipo.int/ 
treaties/en/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2016); see also Margot E. Kaminski, An Overview and 
the Evolution of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 21 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 385, 
388–89 (2011) (The international framework for intellectual property protection 
spans many different forums, from WIPO to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
to individual bilateral agreements to plurilateral agreements like the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).). 
82 Kaminski & Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 12, at 263, 265.  
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Treaty (WCT), the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights by the World Trade Organization (TRIPS), and others.
83
 
On the one hand, international copyright laws grant the owners of 
certain intangible works exclusive rights; on the other hand, those rights 
are granted for a limited time.
84
 A natural tension exists within intellectu-
al property laws, between the rights of authors and the rights of users of 
their work, arising from the notion that copyright law benefits society as a 
whole. From this perspective, copyright law internalizes the distributive 
justice perspective, by, for example, allowing free licenses in certain con-
ditions to use the intangible products. Furthermore, intellectual property 
laws include explicit provisions for exceptions and limitations, because 
the international tools take into consideration the interests of society as a 
whole, not just of individual owners, thereby actually implementing a dis-
tributive justice approach. 
This tension in copyright between the divergent interests of authors 
and users is the foundation of limitations and exceptions to copyright 
laws. On an international level, limitations and exceptions are preserved 
in a three-step test, articulated in several international intellectual prop-
erty agreements.
85
 
The three-step test is an abstract formula that permits unauthorized 
reproductions of copyrighted works “in certain special cases, provided 
that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the author.”
86
 The three-step test on limitations and exceptions was for-
mulated to allow countries to create or preserve their own domestic sys-
tems for limitations and exceptions, which substantially differ from coun-
try to country.
87
 
 
83
See, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121 [hereinafter 
WCT]; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 
245; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
29 [hereinafter TRIPS]; Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms 
Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 886 U.N.T.S. 
67 [hereinafter WPPT] (addressing copyrights in phonograms, which might be 
relevant for people with print disabilities); International Convention for the 
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, 
Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
84
See WCT, supra note 83, art. 29; TRIPS, supra note 83, at 239; Berne 
Convention, supra note 83, art. 1. 
85 WCT, supra note 83, art. 10; TRIPS, supra note 83, arts. 9–12; WPPT, supra 
note 83, art. 16(2); Berne Convention, supra note 83, art. 9; see also Kaminski & 
Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 12, at 266. 
86 Berne Convention, supra note 83, art. 9; Kaminski & Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 
12, at 266. 
87
Senftleben, supra note 4, at 1 (“A country’s specific system of limitations, in 
general, seems to be a sacrosanct feature of domestic copyright laws . . . .”); see also 
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The United States has adopted “fair use” as its version of exceptions 
and limitations. A few scholars have already argued that fair use is sub-
stantially distributive justice. This mechanism of fair use permits unli-
censed use (e.g., copying, exhibiting) of protected copyrighted product. 
The doctrine contains four subtests: the purpose of the use, the nature of 
the copyrighted work, whether or not the copying is transformative, and 
the effect of copying on the market value of the original.
88
 In essence, fair 
use allows more users to enjoy the work without asking for permission 
and without paying. Similarly, compulsory licensing may reflect another 
mechanism of distributive justice, provided by patent law.
89
 
D. Law and Economics Has Become the Dominant Understanding of Intellectual 
Property 
Over the years, the utilitarian-economic-efficiency theories of the law 
and economics approach have been widely cited as the dominant justifi-
cation for the exclusive allocation of intellectual property rights to finan-
cial stakeholders, whereas, originally, intellectual property rights were al-
located to authors and inventors. This shift, allocating rights almost solely 
to firms, was primarily caused by courts upholding contracts, such as em-
ployment agreements, that transferred all intellectual property rights to 
the employer or financial backers on grounds of economic justifications. 
It is uncertain whether this process led to the desirable results of achiev-
ing the “original” goals of intellectual property law.
90
 
 
World Intellectual Prop. Org. Standing Comm. Copyright & Related Rights, Study on 
Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for the Visually Impaired, SCCR/15/7 (Feb. 20, 
2007), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_15/sccr15_7.pdf 
(“The nature and scope of exceptions and limitations to rights has been largely left to 
national policy makers to determine within broad permissive areas.”). 
88 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see also Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. 
Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 551–55, 597 (2008) (A 
survey discussing the way courts implement the fair use doctrine. On the first subtest, 
courts surveyed based their judgments in favor of the fair use doctrine); Shaffer Van 
Houweling, supra note 66, at 1540–42, 1567 (arguing that fair use needs to be shaped 
so that poor artists can enjoy protected works). 
89 Michael Botein & Edward Samuels, Compulsory Licenses in Peer-to-Peer File 
Sharing: A Workable Solution?, 30 S. Ill. U. L.J. 69, 70 (2005); Jon Matthews, Renewing 
Healthy Competition: Compulsory Licenses and Why Abuses of the TRIPS Article 31 Standards 
Are Most Damaging to the United States Healthcare Industry, 4 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship 
& L. 119, 123–24 (2010); Jennifer E. Sturiale, Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual 
Property as Merger Remedy: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 72 La. L. Rev. 605, 625–27 
(2012).  
90 Parker, supra note 74, at 603 (“[T]echnological innovation is one of the 
United States’ most important economic resources . . . .” However, “[t]he United 
States is in danger of losing its position as technological leader of the world. 
American innovation has decreased. The United States has a declining patent 
balance and is less patent productive per dollar than are many foreign countries.”); 
Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 75, at 149, 190–95 (suggesting “a new model of rights 
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Furthermore, it is apparent, from the most recent decisions, that 
courts have played a major role in the validation of this pro-corporate 
policy through enforcement of preinvention assignments of all intellec-
tual property rights from authors and inventors by contract.
91 
Originally, 
the U.S. Constitution as well as U.S. intellectual property statutes allocat-
ed rights to authors and inventors.
92
 Technically, if not de facto, this allo-
cation of intellectual property rights still exists. Nevertheless, instead of 
considering the integral role of inventors and authors, we find continued 
strengthening of a pro-corporate approach.
93
 This recent policy choice is 
part of a phenomenon that began years after the enactment of intellec-
tual property laws, as was already noted by Professor Robert Merges.
94
 In 
this Article, I argue for adoption of policies that embrace the original 
goals of intellectual property laws, which allow for more distributive 
means. Corporations should hold intellectual property rights in circum-
stances where this is justified, but the “goals and justifications” of the cur-
rent U.S. policy of unlimited transferability of intellectual property rights 
“are neither constitutionally based nor theoretically sound.”
95
 
To conclude, the research embodied in this study suggests a desira-
ble new policy for the allocation of rights according to distributive justice 
principles. Application of this approach is evident recently at the interna-
tional level, as shown by several WIPO tools to be discussed in Part VI, in-
fra. 
 
allocation, one which would arguably enlarge the ‘whole pie’ in a manner that would 
benefit the public at large” because this area is so important to the U.S.). 
91 For court decisions, see Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 75, at 151–52 n.29.  
92
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
93 Feldman, supra note 79, at 6667.  
94 Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-
2000, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 2187, 2215–17 (2000) (Merges describes the “corporatization” 
of patent law: “In 1885, only 12% of patents were issued to corporations; by 1998, 
only 12.5% of patents were issued to independent inventors.” He goes on to explain 
that “[t]he rules governing ownership of employee inventions” changed in ways that 
favored corporations, and “[c]ourts demonstrated an eagerness to enforce 
[employment] contracts” signing ownership over to the corporation. The shift toward 
a preference for corporations can be seen in the “emergence of a default rule in favor 
of employers” and in criticism of the tendency to favor the employed inventors); see 
also Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the ‘Fuel of Interest’ from the ‘Fire of Genius’: Law and the 
Employee-Inventor, 1830–1930, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1127, 1141–42 (1998) (explaining 
that the change over the years from innovation based on one inventor, to the 
research and developments of a team of employee inventors, justifies the allocation of 
rights to employers). 
95 Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 75, at 147, 187–89 (arguing for employed inventors 
rights as a tool to improve innovation).  
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V. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: ARE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAWS AN APPROPRIATE TOOL FOR DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE? 
The main question that this Subsection confronts is whether the goal 
of distributive justice should be achieved via intellectual property laws. 
Distributive justice uses both general laws that were primarily and explic-
itly designed to reduce inequality in society, such as progressive tax laws 
and social welfare programs, and specific laws, such as intellectual prop-
erty laws. The following Subsection will address the question of whether a 
general legal tool or a specific legal tool such as intellectual property is 
the most appropriate distributive tool. 
A. The Appropriate Distributive Tool 
An important preliminary question in this context is whether the re-
distribution of resources in society should be made using the legal and 
financial rules that are ordinarily used for these purposes, nationally or 
internationally, such as social security systems, or by employing specific 
private laws, such as, in our case, intellectual property laws. 
Scholars—who support the redistribution of resources in society by 
using a general system of legal rules designed to promote equality, such 
as taxation, welfare, and social security (as opposed to the use of intellec-
tual property or other specific laws)—raise several arguments. First, pro-
prietary distribution using, for example, intellectual property laws, targets 
only certain groups in the population (e.g., authors and inventors) rather 
than all individuals in the society.
96
 Second, the responsibility for fair and 
equal distribution should be borne by government authorities, as op-
posed to private parties governed by law. Third, distribution must be 
made according to the rules that were initially designed for this pur-
pose.
97
 
Other scholars support using specific legal regimes for redistribu-
tion, such as property laws; in my opinion, intellectual property laws 
should be used as well. Professor Hanoch Dagan, for example, argues 
that in order to achieve economic efficiency, property rules must inter-
nalize the distributive justice values.
98
 He disagrees with the claim that au-
thorities are the only ones responsible for distribution and redistribution. 
The author agrees that private property principles can promote equality 
and protect the interests of weak parties, be they individuals or nations. 
In fact, those who fear the social gaps between politically and economi-
cally powerful parties and weak parties need to consider the principles of 
distributive justice within the concepts of property laws. Dagan argues 
 
96 Goold, supra note 13, at 255–56. 
97
See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. Legal. Stud. 667, 669 (1994).  
98
Hanoch Dagan, Property: Values and Institutions 113 (2011). 
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that property law is not as invasive as tax laws, in the sense of their inter-
ference with the freedom of the individual.
99
 
I further argue that, although the common methods of achieving so-
cial equality are through taxation and social security, these methods have 
certain disadvantages, which exist at both the collection phase and the 
distribution-redistribution phase. During the collection phase, there is an 
unequal burden of tax on different socioeconomic groups of society. The 
majority of the burden is borne by the middle class rather than by the 
upper class.
100
 In the distribution phase, waste of resources is inevitable, 
due to the costs of organizing the mechanism of distribution. 
I contend that intellectual property laws are designed and used as a 
tool for distribution of resources. The allocation of intellectual property 
rights to the creators or inventors is an example of the distribution of re-
sources. 
B. Mixed Tools 
Another approach posits that distributive justice can be achieved 
through both general legal regimes and specific legal regimes. Professor 
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir is in favor of using private-law legislation, 
alongside existing systems, for redistribution of resources, pursuing a 
more egalitarian allocation.
101
 This approach rejects the economic argu-
ment that taxes and other payment transfers are the ideal redistribution 
method whereas private laws are more expensive and less effective.
102
 
This proposed approach, which recognizes intellectual property as a 
distributive tool, adopts several values in order to achieve the “good 
 
99
Id. at 132–34, 140–41. While Dagan does not specifically compare property 
laws with tax laws, he argues that property laws are not included in the “cases in which 
law’s coerciveness . . . undermines its normativity.” Id. at 134. For examples of the 
libertarian discussion of the connection between distributions, property, and justice, 
see J. E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law 103–04, 178, 206–07 (1997) (stating 
that there is no connection between the concept of property and distribution of 
justice); Michelman, supra note 39, at 149–50 (arguing that as measures to 
decentralize power in society, the libertarian values of property rights, privacy, and 
security always involve both ownership and distributive dimensions). 
100 Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens of the Federal Income and Payroll 
Taxes on Labor Income, 22 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 3 (2002). 
101 Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 38, at 329–32.  
102
Id. at 334, 339–40; Aanund Hylland & Richard Zeckhauser, Distributional 
Objectives Should Affect Taxes but Not Program Choice or Design, 81 Scand. J. Econ. 264, 
266 (1979); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying 
the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. Legal. Stud. 821, 
822–26 (2000) (asserting that the drawback of the tax system is the double 
inefficiency in the process of collecting the tax and, during the process, dividing it 
among governmental entities). 
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state,” including autonomy and freedom, understanding, achievements, 
and strong, meaningful and joyful social relationships.
103
 
When we promote welfare through intellectual property laws, the 
advantages of distributing benefits through private laws become more 
apparent. If we want to ensure objective welfare and not just increased 
revenue, private laws might be more appropriate in allocating rights, 
powers, and revenues than tax laws and welfare-payment transfers. More-
over, payment transfer per se—to individuals, or developing nations—
could negatively affect internal incentives for productivity. Receiving al-
lowances involves a negative stigma that might affect the motivation to 
produce.
104
 If we expand the definition of “good” beyond the narrow per-
ception of the outcome, we can include in this term the distribution of 
other components such as intellectual property rights.
 
On a humiliation-
reward scale, taxes and payment transfers are closer to the negative end 
of the scale, while using intellectual property laws may be closer to re-
ward, the positive end of the scale. Private laws convey positive messages 
of eligibility and entitlement, and intellectual property legal systems con-
sider and strengthen the interactions among individuals. Private laws, 
then, may increase recipient esteem, whereas receiving payment transfers 
or taxes is perceived as a sign of failure (i.e., as a form of charity and not 
as a right).
105
 
Professor Lewinsohn-Zamir concludes that private laws (e.g., intel-
lectual property laws) may play an important and significant role in dis-
tribution. In her opinion, both methods could and should be used con-
currently.
106
 
I agree that private laws are not the only rules that can be employed 
to achieve equality through distribution of rights and goods; however, the 
importance of international tools should also be considered. 
C. International Tools for Distribution of Justice 
One cannot discuss distributive justice without referring to interna-
tional tools and vice versa, especially in the global and cyber era.
 
One of 
the initial purposes of international tools is to achieve a better balance 
between developed countries and developing countries in the flow of 
capital, access to knowledge, economic growth, workforce quality, and 
many other important factors.
107
 
 
103 Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 38, at 345–46.  
104
Id. at 357.  
105
Id. at 358–60.  
106
Id. at 397.  
107 Ali Imam, How Patent Protection Helps Developing Countries, 33 AIPLA Q. J. 377, 
379 (2005); see Nora Maija Tocups, The Development of Special Provisions in International 
Copyright Law for the Benefit of Developing Countries, 29 Bull. Copyright Soc’y U.S. 402 
(1981).  
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Important treaties have been designed and have served as a means to 
achieve these goals. For example, the Montreal Protocol
108
 and the Kyoto 
Protocol
109 
regarding the reduction of gas emissions, both impose lower 
levels of obligations on developing countries.
110
 Even within the interna-
tional tools for intellectual property, we can find the implementation of 
these concepts, as will be discussed in detail below. For example: TRIPS is 
the world’s most comprehensive and arguably most important interna-
tional agreement nowadays concerning intellectual property; its imple-
mentation is required for membership in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).
111 
However, recognizing that less developed countries may not 
have the legal infrastructure necessary for a smooth or rapid transition to 
a fully compliant intellectual property policy, TRIPS included varying 
implementation deadlines, requiring developed countries to comply by 
January 1, 1996 but allowing developing nations significantly more 
time—in some cases until as late as January 1, 2016.
112
 Furthermore, in 
2001, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
clarified the scope of TRIPS, furthering the WTO’s flexible stance with 
respect to balancing private intellectual property rights and public inter-
ests to promote access to essential medicines for all.
113
 
VI. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TOOLS 
ADOPTING THE DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE APPROACH 
Shifting from the national perspective to the international view re-
veals a different reality. Interestingly and surprisingly, WIPO has changed 
its policy during the last several years towards adopting a balanced ap-
proach that considers the distributive justice point of view as part of its 
 
108 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 
1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. 
109 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162. 
110
Id. at art. 10(c); Montreal Protocol, supra note 108, art. 5; Ilan Benshalom, 
Rethinking International Distributive Justice: Fairness as Insurance, 31 B.U. Int’l L.J. 267, 
285–86 (2013).  
111 TRIPS, supra note 83, art. 1(1). 
112
Id. at arts. 65–66; see also WTO, Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS in the 
WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm (last visited Dec. 
22, 2016). 
113
See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002), https://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm. The WTO’s clarification 
notwithstanding, some have argued that TRIPS represents a shift away from 
international intellectual property policy’s focus on protections as incentives to 
authors toward an issue of profit in the realm of trade. See Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy 
Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How International Law Is Reconceptualizing 
Intellectual Property, 36 Mich. J. Int’l L. 557, 557–60 (2015).  
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agenda. Contemporary tools currently being enacted or negotiated by 
WIPO adopt distributive justice as a main goal. 
The law and economics approach to intellectual property narrowed 
the venue for implementing distributive justice by favoring ownership 
rights and expanding property rights. Exceptions and limitations bal-
anced the interests of the users against the owners. In the context of in-
ternational intellectual property laws, there are some recent develop-
ments that reflect (or are influenced by) the distributive justice ap-
approach. These developments try to take into account the entire set of 
circumstances and values, where access to knowledge, and other human 
rights values, “overrule” ownership rights in intellectual-property prod-
ucts. 
Distributive justice enhances distribution of two sets of values: shar-
ing and distribution of knowledge, and helping mankind promote hu-
man rights values, such as helping people with disabilities or those who 
cannot afford education, or preserving cultural artifacts and historical 
data. Therefore, open access—to books, art, music, and even medicine—
has become a fundamental right in our world. International tools can 
enhance accessibility and better distribution of tangible and intangible 
assets to millions of users around the globe, especially in developing 
countries.
114
 
Three main international tools are discussed in this Part: the first is 
the Marrakesh Treaty, WIPO’s International Instrument on Limitations 
and Exceptions for Visually Impaired Persons (VIPs); the second is the 
ongoing negotiations for an international tool addressing traditional 
knowledge (TK); and the third is the new WIPO initiative regarding re-
search and sharing innovation in the fight against Neglected Tropical 
Diseases (NTDs). 
A.  The Marrakesh Treaty: Access to Knowledge and Printed Materials by 
Visually Impaired Persons (VIP) 
One of the best examples of the implementation of the distributive 
justice concept in intellectual property tools is the Marrakesh Treaty to 
Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually 
Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, adopted by the Diplomatic Con-
ference, on June 27, 2013.
115
 This treaty represents the new realm of an 
 
114 Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 2821, 2907–08 (2006) (favoring exceptions and limitations in intellectual 
property treaties).  
115 Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who 
Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, June 27, 2013, VIP/DC/8 
REV [hereinafter Marrakesh Treaty]. The Treaty went into effect on Sept. 30, 2016, 
upon ratification by 20 countries. For a list of all current ratifying countries, see 
Contracting Parties > Marrakesh VIP Treaty, World Intell. Prop. Org., http://www. 
wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=843 (last visited Dec. 22, 
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exceptions and limitations tool applied in the service of a distributive jus-
tice goal. The paucity of copyrighted written works accessible to VIPs rep-
resents a human rights issue of global proportions. According to esti-
mates of the World Health Organization (WHO), there are 285 million 
people with print disabilities; but in developed countries only 5% of 
books are available in accessible formats.
116
 In developing countries, 
where approximately 90% of visually impaired persons live, the percent-
age of books that are available in accessible formats is significantly lower, 
probably less than 1%, resulting in “book famine.”
117
 By providing specific 
limitations and exceptions to copyright, the Marrakesh Treaty allows VIPs 
global access to printed materials (and, consequently, to the knowledge 
embodied therein). The Marrakesh Treaty permits visually impaired per-
sons to transfer printed materials into other accessible formats, such as 
Braille or audio, without seeking permission or paying licensing rights to 
the owner (i.e., the publisher). Before the treaty went into effect, con-
verting material in this way or trading these audio or Braille versions 
across borders was considered a copyright infringement. Therefore, the 
treaty achieves distributive justice through the international exceptions 
and legal tools. I argue that the Marrakesh Treaty, then, is especially sig-
nificant because WIPO created a new-egalitarian-Rawlsian-international 
instrument.
118
 This was a significant shift from WIPO’s previous stance of 
excluding nonstakeholders from using the intellectual property product 
without either license or permission. 
Furthermore, although the Marrakesh Treaty applies only to a single 
field, it represents a step towards a distributive justice approach to the 
evolution needed in a long list of areas. This approach to distributive jus-
tice applies to other domains in addition to visual impairment, such as 
people with other disabilities, as well as to justice in such services as those 
involving food supplies (e.g., generic resources of crops) and educa-
tion.
119
 
 
2016). The Treaty seeks to honor the underlying policy of the fair use doctrine and 
distributive justice. See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 
Harv. L. Rev. 1659, 1688–89 (1988). 
116 Lida Ayoubi, The Marrakesh Treaty: Fixing International Copyright Law for the 
Benefit of the Visually Impaired Persons, 13 N.Z. J. Pub. & Int’l L. 255, 255 (2015). 
117
Id. at 256; Visual Impairment and Blindness, World Health Org., http://www. 
who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs282/en/ (last updated Aug. 2014). 
118
Diplomatic Conference to Conclude a Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works by 
Visually Impaired Persons and Persons with Print Disabilities, World Intell. Prop. Org., 
http://www.wipo.int/dc2013/en/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2016). The negotiations 
successfully concluded with adoption of the treaty in June 2013, granting accessibility 
for persons with print disabilities by providing specific limitations and exceptions to 
copyright. 
119 Keith Aoki, Food Forethought: Intergenerational Equity and Global Food Supply—
Past, Present, and Future, 2011 Wis. L. Rev. 399, 401–04, 411 (“[P]overty is the primary 
cause for hunger. Almost 40 percent of the world’s population earns less than $2 per 
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By granting rights to people who did not have them previously, the 
Marrakesh Treaty enables them to participate in cultural, educational, 
economic, and other aspects of society.
120
 As previously mentioned, inter-
nationally speaking, the distributive justice impact of the treaty is even 
stronger due to the fact that the treaty also permits cross-border distribu-
tion of accessible formats to VIPs.
121
 
The negotiation among representatives of the stakeholders was not a 
trouble-free process.
122
 Nonetheless, the Treaty adopted a hard-law form 
and represents WIPO’s first international exceptions and limitations tool, 
in contrast to all the former tools creating intellectual property rights.
123
 
By adopting the distributive justice perspective, the Treaty may fix a mar-
ket failure resulting from the fact that publishers have not supplied 
enough accessible materials to visually impaired persons around the 
globe,
124
 especially in developing countries.
125
 
 
day” making food difficult to secure. The food supply should be given a more 
distributive and corrective justice based treatment by international organizations, 
such as the WTO. This article suggests creating a decentralized food production 
system. “Distributive justice premised on the idea of greatest good for the greatest 
number provides justification for a roughly egalitarian redistribution of access to 
basic goods” and benefits). 
120 Marrakesh Treaty, supra note 115, art. 4(2) (“Authorized entities shall be 
permitted, without the authorization of the copyright holder, to make an accessible 
format copy of a work, obtain from another authorized entity an accessible format 
copy, and supply those copies to beneficiary persons by any means, including by non-
commercial lending or by electronic communication by wire or wireless means, and 
undertake any intermediate steps to achieve those objectives, when all of the 
following conditions are met: (i) the authorized entity wishing to undertake said 
activity has lawful access to that work or a copy of that work; (ii) the work is converted 
to an accessible format copy, which may include any means needed to navigate 
information in the accessible format, but does not introduce changes other than 
those needed to make the work accessible to the beneficiary person; (iii) such 
accessible format copies are supplied exclusively to be used by beneficiary persons; 
and (iv) the activity is undertaken on a non-profit basis . . . .”). 
121
Id. at art. 5. 
122 N. Cameron Russell, The Treaty for the Visually Impaired and Print Disabled—A 
Trojan Horse for Copyleft?, in Legal Challenges of New Technology: Cyberspace, 
Privacy and More (Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid et al. eds., forthcoming 2017) (on file 
with author) (arguing that the obstacles in the negotiations reflect some political 
forces). 
123 Kaminski & Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 12, at 260, 263; see International Treaties 
and Conventions on Intellectual Property, in WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: 
Policy, Law and Use (2004). 
124 Aaron Scheinwald, Who Could Possibly Be Against a Treaty for the Blind?, 22 
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 445, 494–97 (2012).  
125 Kaminski & Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 12, at 283, 289–91. 
LCB_21_1_Article_1_Yanisky-Ravid (Do Not Delete) 2/12/2017  12:11 PM 
32 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:1 
B. Traditional Knowledge (TK) 
The term “traditional knowledge” (TK) is generally used to describe 
the intellectual and intangible concepts which are the result of a specific 
cultural heritage, such as the customs and methods of indigenous tribes 
and local traditional communities.
126 
Conceptualizing and defining the 
phrase traditional knowledge has not been an easy task. TK encompasses 
information and intellectual property that identifies a specific communi-
ty that have developed over time and been considered as a collective asset 
embodying local cultural and environmental experience. TK is trans-
ferred by cultural means and sustains the community and its culture. Fur-
ther, it helps maintain the genetic resources the community needs for 
survival. 
From an intellectual property perspective, as opposed to the heritage 
value of the knowledge, TK “embraces both the substance of the 
knowledge itself as well as traditional cultural expressions” such as folk-
lore, in addition to inventions and other intellectual property products, 
such as traditional cultural marks.
127
 TK ranges from cultural expressions 
to medical, agricultural, social, ecological, biological, and other do-
mains.
128
 Examples include plants used in healing or bodily processes 
 
126 World Intellectual Prop. Org. Intergovernmental Comm. on Intellectual 
Prop. & Genetic Res., Traditional Knowledge & Folklore, Questionnaire on Recognition 
of Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Resources in the Patent System, 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/Q.5 (July 2004), http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details. 
jsp?doc_id=30774 (broadly describes a category of subject matter that is comprised of 
intellectual and intangible products of a specific cultural heritage, including customs 
and methods of traditional communities. Such communities would include 
indigenous peoples and local communities); see also World Intellectual Prop. Org. 
Intergovernmental Comm. on Intellectual Prop. & Genetic Res., Traditional 
Knowledge & Folklore, The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Draft Gap Analysis: 
Revision, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/13/5(b) Rev. (Oct. 13, 2008), http://www.wipo.int/ 
meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=109672 (The term “traditional knowledge” as 
used by WIPO includes the fields of genetic resources and traditional cultural 
expressions.). 
127 World Intellectual Prop. Org. Intergovernmental Comm. on Intellectual 
Prop. & Genetic Res., Traditional Knowledge & Folklore, Traditional Knowledge: Policy 
and Legal Options, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/4 (Dec. 12, 2003), http:// 
www.wipo.int/portal/en/index.html.  
128 World Intellectual Prop. Org. Intergovernmental Comm. on Intellectual 
Prop. & Genetic Res., Traditional Knowledge & Folklore, The Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge: Revised Objectives and Principles, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/17/5 (Sept. 15, 2010), 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/details.jsp?meeting_id=20207 (specific examples 
of TK include the knowledge developed through creative pursuits in the context of 
traditional society or culture, such as customary practices or culture-specific skills); 
PCT Notable Inventions: Hoodia Appetite Suppressant, World Intel. Prop. Org., 
http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/inventions/hoodia/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2016) 
[hereinafter WIPO, Hoodia]; see also PCT Application, World Intel. Prop. Org. (July 
2015), http://patentscope.wipo.int/search/en/search.jsf search for application 
WO/1998/046243 [hereinafter WIPO, Application]. 
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(e.g., hoodia), folk dances and songs, spices (e.g., turmeric) and foods 
characteristic of the community, and crafts (e.g., weaving and pottery). 
At present there is no consensus in the international community as 
to the definition of TK. WIPO, however, offers the following definition: 
“Traditional knowledge is knowledge, know-how, skills and practices that 
are developed, sustained and passed on from generation to generation 
within a community, often forming part of its cultural or spiritual identi-
ty.”
129
 
TK as an intellectual property concern has become especially signifi-
cant in light of the profit the pharmaceutical industry sees in traditional 
medicinal knowledge and the potential of biodiversity.
130
 Being aware of 
the unfair enrichment resulting from commercial use of TK by entities 
coming from developed countries (usually without compensating the in-
digenous communities)—WIPO took action. 
The mission of the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual 
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, 
established by WIPO, is to create international tools to protect traditional 
cultural expressions and other forms of TK and to consider intellectual 
property tools that may be applicable in this context, such as benefit shar-
ing in genetic or cultural resources.
131
 To that end, WIPO has led negoti-
ations with representatives of countries for many years. By doing so, 
WIPO expressed an international distributive justice approach one more 
time. 
Another hurdle WIPO faced involved policy issues. Although the pol-
icy issues concerning TK are diverse and cover a broad range of con-
cerns, WIPO divides intellectual property issues roughly into two key 
themes: defensive protection and proactive protection.
132
 The former 
protects the owners of TK against third party actions that could result in 
illegitimate or unfounded intellectual property rights in TK. An example 
of this type of measure already in place is the amendments to the WIPO-
 
129
Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property, World Intel Prop. Org., 
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2016). 
130
World Intel. Prop. Org., Background Brief #6: Intellectual Property and 
Traditional Medical Knowledge (2016), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/ 
en/documents/pdf/background_briefs-e-n6-web.pdf; Traditional Knowledge and 
Intellectual Property, supra note 129. However, TK that has ancient roots and is often 
preserved orally is not protected by conventional intellectual property systems. 
131
Traditional Knowledge, World Intel Prop. Org., http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/ 
(last visited Dec. 22, 2016). 
132 World Intellectual Prop. Org. Intergovernmental Comm. on Intellectual 
Prop. & Genetic Res., Traditional Knowledge & Folklore, Defensive Protection Measures 
Relating to Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge: An Update, 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/8 (Dec. 15, 2003), http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/ 
doc_details.jsp?doc_id=21094; IP Infringement Online: The Dark Side of Digital, WIPO 
Mag. (April 2007), http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2011/02/article_0007. 
html. 
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administered patent systems (the International Patent Classification Sys-
tem and the Patent Cooperation Treaty Minimum Documentation). The 
latter, proactive protection is, for example, provided by databases some 
countries and communities are developing to document TK as prior art 
so as to prevent property rights from being asserted in the first place. 
In an attempt to offer practical assistance to TK stakeholders, WIPO 
has developed a toolkit for documenting TK, available at WIPO’s website. 
Moreover, the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual 
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore is 
in the process of negotiating the possible adoption of an international 
legal instrument.
133
 
There are at least three ways to allocate intellectual property rights 
in TK to indigenous people. One way is contractual, by paying considera-
tion. Another is through assigning trademarks, geographical identifica-
tion—like rights, copyright-like moral rights such as attribution, and oth-
er common intellectual property tools.
134
 The third set of solutions may 
also include some voluntary agreements.
135
 Any of these (or other) solu-
tions face legal and political obstacles, such as the challenge of propertiz-
ing public domain knowledge and products and the problem of identify-
ing beneficiaries (i.e., whether rights belong to the country, the tribe, 
certain castes, etc.).
136
 The idea of protecting TK that has not been root-
ed in a specific treaty has influenced the market toward adopting a dis-
tributive justice attitude.
137 
Provisions regarding TK do already exist in some international trea-
ties and other instruments. Article 8(j) of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity refers to “knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous 
 
133
See World Intellectual Prop. Org., Intellectual Property Needs and Expectations of 
Traditional Knowledge: WIPO Report on Fact-Finding Missions on Intellectual Property and 
Traditional Knowledge (1998–1999), 235 (2001), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/ 
pubdocs/en/tk/768/wipo_pub_768.pdf.  
134
See, e.g., Javier Garcia, Fighting Biopiracy: The Legislative Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge, 18 Berkeley La Raza L.J. 5 (2007); Deepa Varadarajan, A Trade Secret 
Approach to Protecting Traditional Knowledge, 36 Yale J. Int’l L. 371 (2011); Weerawit 
Weeraworawit, Formulating an International Legal Protection for Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore: Challenges for the Intellectual Property System, 11 
Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 769 (2003). 
135
See, e.g., V. Geingos & M. Ngakaeja, Intellectual Property as a Lever for Economic 
Growth: The African Experience, Part II, WIPO Mag., Nov.–Dec. 2003, at 6–10; David 
Reid, New Medicines from Traditional Knowledge, in Legal Challenges of New 
Technology: Cyberspace, Privacy and More (Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid et al. eds., 
forthcoming 2017) (on file with author); WIPO, Hoodia, supra note 128. The PCT 
application is available at WIPO, Application, supra note 128. 
136 Garcia, supra note 134, at 10–16 (describing the difficulties in American and 
Mexican legislation); Varadarajan, supra note 134, at 394–96; see also Weeraworawit, 
supra note 134. 
137 Varadarajan, supra note 134, at 396–98, 419–20 (suggesting the trade secret 
law norms for traditional TK). 
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and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity;”
138
 the Nagoya 
Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization refers to “traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources;”
139
 the UNESCO Conven-
tion for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 2003, is re-
lated to intangible cultural heritage;
140
 the UNESCO Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 2005, 
is related to the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural ex-
pressions;
141
 and the Article of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture of the Food and Agricultural Organ-
ization deals with protection of TK relevant to plant genetic resources for 
food and agriculture.
142
 TK is also promoted and protected through vari-
 
138 Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 8(j), June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 
(“Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate: . . . [s]ubject to 
its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and 
practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles 
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and promote 
their wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders of such 
knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices.”). 
139 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, preamble and art. 5, Jan. 20, 2011, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27. 
The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity was adopted at the 10th Conference of Parties of the CBD.  
140 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, art. 
2(1), Oct. 17, 2003, 2368 U.N.T.S. 35 (defining “intangible cultural heritage” as “the 
practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills—as well as the instruments, 
objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith—that communities, groups 
and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage”).  
141 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, art. 4(3), Oct. 20, 2005, 2440 U.N.T.S. 311 (defining “[c]ultural 
expressions” as “those expressions that result from the creativity of individuals, 
groups and societies, and that have cultural content.” It recognizes the importance of 
TK as a source of intangible and material wealth, and in particular the knowledge 
systems of protection and promotion). 
142 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 
art. 9.2, Nov. 3, 2001, 2400 U.N.T.S. 303 (The Treaty provides that “[t]he Contracting 
Parties agree that the responsibility for realizing Farmers’ Rights, as they relate to 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, rests with national governments. In 
accordance with their needs and priorities, each Contracting Party should, as 
appropriate, and subject to its national legislation, take measures to protect and 
promote Farmers’ Rights, including: (a) protection of traditional knowledge relevant 
to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture.”). 
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ous laws and international declarations, like the United National Declara-
tion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
143
 
C. Access to Medicines: WIPO Re:Search Project and More 
For pharmaceutical firms, the intellectual property regime, in gen-
eral, and patents, in particular, represent the guarantee of a return on 
the enormous investment necessary for the development of new drugs. 
This system allows the pharmaceutical industry to essentially dictate their 
licensing terms and conditions, which leads to high prices for patented 
drugs. These costs result in many people—particularly those in develop-
ing countries—being unable to afford these drugs. As a practical matter, 
then, this represents an often insurmountable obstacle, thereby depriv-
ing these people full access to these medications and, consequently, to 
the good, or at least improved, health they can procure.
144
 
 
143 World Intellectual Prop. Org. Intergovernmental Comm. on Intellectual 
Prop. & Genetic Res., Traditional Knowledge & Folklore, List and Brief Technical 
Explanation of Various Forms in Which Traditional Knowledge May Be Found, 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/17/INF/9 (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/ 
sct/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_17/wipo_grtkf_ic_17_inf_9.pdf; Laws and Legislative Measures, 
World Intell. Prop. Org., http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/legal_texts/ (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2016). 
144 Krista L. Cox, The Medicines Patent Pool: Promoting Access and Innovation for Life-
Saving Medicines Through Voluntary Licenses, 4 Hastings Sci. & Tech. L.J. 291, 293–94 
(2012); Amir H. Khoury, The “Public Health” of the Conventional International Patent 
Régime and the Ethics of “Ethicals”: Access to Patented Medicines, 26 Cardozo Arts & Ent. 
L.J. 25, 32–33 (2008); Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective 
Action, 34 Am. J. L. & Med. 345, 358 (2008); see also Dean Baker, Current Drug-Patent 
System Is Bad Medicine, Aljazeera Am. (Nov. 24, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/ 
opinions/2014/11/drug-patents-pharmaceuticalindustrygenericsindia.html. The 
extremely high cost of developing drugs ($2.6 billion) is the inefficient result of the 
patent system and not the other way around. “Patent monopolies create absurd 
problems in paying for drugs that would be relatively cheap in a free market.” Id. The 
patent system is heavily relied upon by the pharmaceutical companies to protect their 
extensive development costs. At the same time, patent protection contributes to 
“bloated development costs . . . .” Id. As a result, many people are deprived of access 
to medicine because patents prevent less expensive generic drugs from being 
developed. Licenses controlling drug manufacture as well as use, further make access 
to affordable medication prohibitive by enabling pharmaceutical companies to 
collect their investments back via licenses and extremely expensive prices, all 
protected by the patent systems. Consequently, many people, especially but not only 
in developing countries, lack full access to medications and hence health. See also 
Bruce Lehman, The Pharmaceutical Industry and the Patent System, at 2–3 (2003), 
http://users.wfu.edu/mcfallta/DIR0/pharma_patents.pdf (“[T]he WTO Council 
recently affirmed that the TRIPS Agreement permits such compulsory licenses in 
health emergencies, even in cases where the compulsory license is for an imported 
product.”). 
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WIPO usually implicitly supports this policy and encourages devel-
oped countries to adopt an intellectual property regime.
145
 However, an 
interesting shift in WIPO’s policy is reflected in its new projects empha-
sizing access to medicine.
146
 WIPO has decided to consider public domain 
islands within its policy, thus embracing a distributive justice point of 
view as part of its official agenda. Adopting this new policy enables WIPO 
to reconsider its role as an international organization and its goals of 
promoting innovation in coordination with the latest developments, mak-
ing the agency more relevant. 
Another excellent example is the WIPO Re:Search project on shar-
ing innovation in the fight against NTDs, such as malaria and tuberculo-
sis.
147
 According to WIPO, 
More than 1 billion people are affected by NTDs each year . . . ten 
million people die from NTDs annually. Millions more are so inca-
pacitated by such disease that they are unable to work, care for 
themselves, or care for their children. These diseases predominant-
ly affect the poorest people in the least developed countries.
148
 
Free market solutions are inefficient and insufficient. Lack of in-
vestment in drug development results from lack of incentives, so medi-
cine and healing are neither common nor accessible, notwithstanding 
the enormous number of patients. To address the essential need for “new 
and better drugs, diagnostics and vaccines,”
149
 WIPO created the WIPO 
Re:Search project based on international distributive justice values. 
Through the project, organizations share “intellectual property, com-
pounds, expertise, facilities, and know-how royalty-free . . . .” The open 
environment promotes cooperation among researchers from leading 
pharmaceutical firms and enables them to develop medical solutions for 
diseases, mainly in developing countries.
150
 
 
145
See Sisule F. Musungu & Graham Dutfield, Multilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-
Plus World: The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (Quaker United Nations 
Office, TRIPS Issues Papers No. 3, 2003). 
146
See, e.g., WIPO Re:Search, World Intellectual Prop. Org., http://www.wipo. 
int/research/en/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2016). WIPO Re:Search was established in 
2011 by WIPO in collaboration with BIO Ventures for Global Health and with the 
active participation of leading pharmaceutical companies and other private and 
public sector research organizations. 
147 Anatole Krattiger, Promoting Access to Medical Innovation, WIPO Mag., Oct. 
2013, at 5, 7. 
148
WIPO Re:Search, supra note 146; see Neglected Tropical Diseases, World Health 
Org., http://www.who.int/neglected_diseases/diseases/en/ (last visited Dec. 22, 
2016). 
149
See WIPO Re:Search, supra note 146 (WIPO Re:Search stimulates more research 
and development for new and better treatment options for those suffering from these 
conditions, mainly, as mentioned, in developing countries).  
150
Id. According to WIPO, NTDs, “malaria and tuberculosis affect more than 
one billion people across the globe. Although recent years have seen the arrival of 
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The open-access policy exemplifies several distributive justice princi-
ples. First, it provides royalty-free licenses for research, development, and 
manufacture anywhere in the world. Second, it makes products available 
royalty-free to the least developed countries. Third, it considers, in good 
faith, access for all developing countries, taking into account the eco-
nomic development of the countries and the need to facilitate access to 
disadvantaged populations.
151
 
Several critical benefits of the distributive justice international meth-
od as applied to intellectual property products are highlighted by this 
new approach. According to WIPO, the policy of open access and com-
mon knowledge catalyzes the research and development of medical 
products for NTDs through innovative research partnerships and 
knowledge sharing. This approach increases the probability, and effi-
ciency, of success and diminishes the high costs that have prevented in-
vestments in accessible pharmaceuticals. The targeted result is interna-
tional distributive justice oriented: WIPO “offers its members access to an 
extensive range of knowledge assets, compounds, technology, and exper-
tise provided by other private and public sector members. This saves sci-
entists valuable resources and time.”
152
 
The goal of this project, explicitly declared by WIPO, is to “benefit 
patients in the [l]east [d]eveloped [c]ountries . . . by creating an open 
innovation platform through which public and private sector entities can 
share” information as well as intellectual property.
153 
I claim that interna-
tional organizations such as WIPO have the potential to use international 
intellectual property tools beyond national interests and help achieve 
better distribution of goods, information, rights, and power, beyond bor-
ders and governments to developing countries (with poor economies and 
markets). In other words, international organizations can bring a differ-
ent meaning to laws to better promote distributive justice. 
The example of WIPO Re:Search further promotes distributive jus-
tice in favor of developing countries in several venues. First, it improves 
access to medicines, especially for developing countries, to the benefit of 
the poor and the needy. Second, it enhances access to knowledge and 
 
new R&D models and extra resources, there remains a pressing need to bridge 
research gaps and bring together knowledge, skills and infrastructure from the 
private, non-profit, and academic sectors.” World Intel. Prop. Org. Re:Search, 
Sharing Innovation in the Fight Against Neglected Tropical Diseases (Aug. 
2014), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/research/docs/flyer_wiporesearch_ 
2014.pdf. 
151
Id. 
152
Id. The consortium of WIPO Re:Search was established as a collaboration 
between WIPO and BIO Ventures for Global Health and includes participating 
institutions from different sectors. The consortium is a voluntary endeavor open to 
private and public entities. Id.  
153
World Intel. Prop. Org. Re:Search, Guiding Principles (June 8, 2011), 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/research/docs/guiding_principles.pdf.  
LCB_21_1_Article_1_Yanisky-Ravid (Do Not Delete) 2/12/2017  12:11 PM 
2017] HIDDEN THOUGH FLOURISHING JUSTIFICATION 39 
technology for developing countries. Third, it encourages developed 
countries to share knowledge and technology with developing countries. 
According to WIPO, 105 countries have agreed to the model, and lead-
ing pharmaceutical firms, such as Novartis, as well as leading universities, 
have joined the project.
154
 
The phenomenon of giving intellectual property laws a new and dif-
ferent meaning by adopting the distributive justice approach, resulting in 
providing access to medicines, stands in contrast to the traditional point 
of view in which intellectual property is solely controlled by the owner. It 
is further illustrated by a few more examples. 
As reported in the Journal of Laboratory Physicians, “[h]epatitis B infec-
tion is one of the major public health problems globally and is the tenth 
leading cause of death. Worldwide, more than two billion of the popula-
tion show evidence of past or recent HBV infection and more than 350 
million are chronic carriers of this infection.”
155
 India, located in an in-
termediate HBV endemic zone with 50 million cases, is the second largest 
global pool of chronic HBV infections.
156
 
The prices of HBV vaccines, produced mainly by the primary phar-
maceutical firms in this market (Merck and Glaxo-Smith-Klein), were rel-
atively high. These firms were mostly interested in marketing to the de-
veloped countries where they had registered patents.
157
 After the Global 
Fund for Children’s Vaccine was established with seed funding from the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and later by a Korean entity, by li-
censing another vaccine developed by Rhein Biotech and using different 
distribution methods in developing countries, where permitted, prices 
were reduced dramatically—to less than a dollar per dose.
158
 
Another example, this time of a hepatitis C vaccine being distributed 
differently to developed and developing countries, was recently pub-
lished.
159
 Gilead Sciences allowed generic manufacture of its expensive 
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See Collaboration Agreements, World Intel. Prop. Org., http:// 
www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/research/docs/collaboration_agreements.pdf (last 
updated Nov. 21, 2016).  
155 Varsha Singha et al., Hepatitis B in Health Care Workers: Indian Scenario, 1 J. Lab. 
Physicians 41, 41 (2009). 
156  Sibnarayan Datta, An Overview of Molecular Epidemiology of Hepatitis B Virus 
(HBV) in India,  5 Virology J. 156 (2008), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ 
articles/PMC2640379/; Swati Gupta et al., Role of Horizontal Transmission in Hepatitis B 
Virus Spread Among Household Contacts in North India, 51 Intervirology 7, 13 (2008). 
157 Richard T. Mahoney, DNA Hepatitis B Vaccine: International Vaccine Institute, 
Korea (Case Study 9), in Intellectual Property Management in Health and 
Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of Best Practices CS 17 (Anatole 
Krattiger et al. eds., 2014). 
158
Id. 
159
See Zydus Cadila Bags License for Hepatitis C Drug, Bus. Standard Online 
(Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/zydus-
granted-license-to-produce-generic-hepatitis-c-drug-114091500834_1.html (“There 
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vaccines (sofobuvir and ledipasvir, used for treatment of chronic hepati-
tis C) for distribution in 91 developing countries.
160 
Similarly, Golden Rice is considered a major source of food for bil-
lions of people in developing countries. Its development demonstrates 
once again a distributive justice approach. The rice, grown fortified with 
Vitamins A and D, prevents loss of eyesight due to these common vitamin 
deficiencies, especially among children and pregnant women.
161
 Thus, 
much good can be achieved by the licensing of this fortified rice in de-
veloping countries.
162
 
In all of these cases, innovative intellectual property products and 
new methods of distribution of these products in developing countries 
was accomplished without infringement of patents in developed coun-
tries through the use of patent law exceptions and innovative application 
of existing patent laws. This, then, is another avenue for incorporating 
distributive justice principles into intellectual property laws by way of in-
ternational tools. I further conclude that according a special free license 
for humanitarian goals is a desirable and necessary interpretation of both 
new and existing patent laws.
163
 
 
are nearly 10 million patients suffering from hepatitis C in India. The problem is 
further compounded by the fact that patients remain undiagnosed” until the later 
stages of the disease “and can ill afford the treatment.”).  
160 Press Release, Gilead Sciences, Inc., Gilead Announces Generic Licensing 
Agreements to Increase Access to Hepatitis C Treatments in Developing Countries (Sept. 15, 
2014), http://www.gilead.com/news/press-releases/2014/9/gilead-announces-generic-
licensing-agreements-to-increase-access-to-hepatitis-c-treatments-in-developing-countries. 
161 Anatole Krattiger, Golden Rice: A Product-Development Partnership in Agricultural 
Biotechnology and Humanitarian Licensing (Case Study 3), in Intellectual Property 
Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of Best 
Practices, supra note 157, at CS 11. 
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Id.  
163
See TRIPS, supra note 83, art. 31 (“Where the law of a Member allows for 
other use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right 
holder, including use by the government or third parties authorized by the 
government, the following provisions shall be respected: (a) authorization of such 
use shall be considered on its individual merits; (b) such use may only be permitted 
if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from 
the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such 
efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time. This requirement 
may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use. In 
situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the 
right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable. In the 
case of public non-commercial use, where the government or contractor, without 
making a patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid 
patent is or will be used by or for the government, the right holder shall be informed 
promptly; (c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for 
which it was authorized, and in the case of semi-conductor technology shall only be 
for public non-commercial use or to remedy a practice determined after judicial or 
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This Article has reviewed the fundamental concepts of distributive 
justice as a philosophy that underlies and justifies protection for intellec-
tual property by employing an equality approach. This is in contrast to 
the more predominant schools of thought with respect to intellectual 
property justifications: the Lockean approach, protecting the fruits of la-
bor,
164
 and the school of thought prevailing in the United States, the law 
and economics approach.
165
 In this Article we adopted Rawls’s theory of 
 
administrative process to be anti-competitive; (d) such use shall be non-exclusive; (e) 
such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill 
which enjoys such use; (f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the 
supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use; (g) authorization 
for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate protection of the legitimate interests 
of the persons so authorized, to be terminated if and when the circumstances which 
led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur. The competent authority shall have 
the authority to review, upon motivated request, the continued existence of these 
circumstances; (h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the 
circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the 
authorization; (i) the legal validity of any decision relating to the authorization of 
such use shall be subject to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct 
higher authority in that Member; (j) any decision relating to the remuneration 
provided in respect of such use shall be subject to judicial review or other 
independent review by a distinct higher authority in that Member; (k) Members are 
not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (b) and (f) where such 
use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative 
process to be anti-competitive. The need to correct anti-competitive practices may be 
taken into account in determining the amount of remuneration in such cases. 
Competent authorities shall have the authority to refuse termination of authorization 
if and when the conditions which led to such authorization are likely to recur; (l) 
where such use is authorized to permit the exploitation of a patent (‘the second 
patent’) which cannot be exploited without infringing another patent (‘the first 
patent’), the following additional conditions shall apply: (i) the invention claimed in 
the second patent shall involve an important technical advance of considerable 
economic significance in relation to the invention claimed in the first patent; (ii) the 
owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a cross-license on reasonable terms to use 
the invention claimed in the second patent; and (iii) the use authorized in respect of 
the first patent shall be non-assignable except with the assignment of the second 
patent.”). For additional perspectives on TRIPS, see Donald Harris, TRIPS After Fifteen 
Years: Success or Failure, as Measured by Compulsory Licensing, 18 J. Intell. Prop. L. 367, 
386 (2011); Jessica J. Fayerman, The Spirit of TRIPS and the Importation of Medicines 
Made Under Compulsory License After the August 2003 TRIPS Council Agreement, 25 Nw. J. 
Int’l L. & Bus. 257, 258 (2004); Sara Germano, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals 
in Southeast Asia: Paving the Way for Greater Use of the TRIPS Flexibility in Low-and Middle-
Income Countries, 76 UMKC L. Rev. 273, 294 (2007); Divya Murthy, The Future of 
Compulsory Licensing: Deciphering the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, 17 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1299, 1307–08 (2001). 
164 Sterk, supra note 27, at 1234–39. 
165 Richard M. Hare, Justice and Equality, in Justice and Economic 
Distribution 116 (John Arthur & William H. Shaw eds., 1978); see Elizabeth 
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justice as the basic concept of distributive justice. Clearly the discussion 
of social justice is related to the concept of equality. The right to equality 
is one of the most valuable human rights.
166
 
Is distributive justice meant to serve the interests of the poor exclu-
sively or to benefit society as a whole? I argue that an equal distribution 
does not focus solely on assistance to the needy, but, rather, on equal dis-
tribution among all levels of society. The need for such an approach has 
strengthened lately, in light of the growing socioeconomic gaps among 
countries and within countries experiencing increasingly stratified levels 
of society.
167
 
Nationally speaking, the United States suffers an extreme inequality 
in the allocation of goods.
168
 Twenty individuals in the United States hold 
among themselves more capital than half of the entire population of the 
United States.
169
 The products of economic growth are divided unequally, 
resting disproportionately with the elite upper class; the wealth of the 
“top 400” has seen its share of the nation’s total wealth increase from 1% 
to 3% over the last 30 years.
170
 Meanwhile, the rest of the population’s 
share of the nation’s overall wealth has decreased dramatically, with the 
bottom 90% of the population owning only 23% of the pie.
171
 Thus, the 
magnitude of inequality of ownership over resources increases progres-
sively. 
 
Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. & 
Econ. 73, 91–95 (1982) (an empirical study focused on and tested the three 
approaches, showing that subjects preferred to adopt equal distribution and Lockean 
rules, avoiding utilitarian rules). 
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(2003); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 640–41 (1987); Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 488, 493 (1954); European Convention on Human Rights, 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
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Resources are inarguably valuable, but distributive justice does not 
target essential material needs exclusively; it considers access to 
knowledge and cultural needs to be important as well. Agreeing with this 
perspective, Professor Andrei Marmor states that distribution principles 
strive for real equality rather than ensuring minimal subsistence.
172
 Pro-
fessor Marmor adopts Ronald Dworkin’s “envy test”: in his opinion, a dis-
tribution is insufficient if afterwards one individual envies the other. 
Based on the discussion above, I claim that, for many reasons, intel-
lectual property laws can serve as an efficient tool for achieving distribu-
tive justice, at least in the realm of intellectual property. Even though in-
tellectual property laws were created in accordance with distributive 
justice principles, the utilitarian economic justifications adopted by poli-
cy makers recast intellectual property laws, preferring utilitarian econom-
ic aspects to others and becoming the dominant school of thought in 
contemporary intellectual property theory.
173
 I argue that limiting one’s 
understanding of intellectual property to the influence of the law and 
economics theory influences the outcomes. Scholars “who justify increas-
ing corporate power and broadening protection in the allocation of intel-
lectual property . . . rights usually anchor their conclusions in law and 
economics.” The predominance of the utilitarian calculus likewise influ-
ences the scope and content of today’s intellectual property laws.
174
 But 
there is another way—a way that promotes the fundamental values of jus-
tice and equality that ostensibly underlie the very basis of the founding of 
the United States of America, and thus a way that certainly deserves seri-
ous consideration in shaping the nation’s intellectual property policy to-
ward more egalitarian results. 
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